http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/journalview.php?space_key=1&module_key=4 Archive of 21 lectures in introductory game theory, from a course I delivered in semester 1 down under here in NZ Feb to June 2007 . I suggest you click on the "Reverse Sort Order " text/link in blue in the right hand menu bar (top right) to see clips in chronological) orderEach clip is about 50 minutes. Downloadable versions (see mov or mp4 link just under the on screen viewer) usually have a menu; these are mostly screen capture and coordinated audio, with some overlays of class interaction (voyeuristic, but sometimes a little slow compared to lecture style...) There is a comments box below each media clip - comment away The downloadable video files are typically quite large (80 to several hundred Mb) Quicktime (".mov") or .mp4 files with a larger screen size (640x480) - ok for broadband; Copyright resides in the author/presenter, usually me, but sometimes someone else... (non commercial use and share-alike derivative works are ok) This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. support for this open education project comes from the UC College of Business and Economics (Thanks Nigel!!) - but all errors of ommission and commission are mine! JF Please let me know if you have any difficulties using the material or suggestions for improvements. John Fountain Interact http://interactole.org http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/modules/journal/4/4/rssImage.jpg http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/journalview.php?space_key=1&module_key=4 Archive of 21 lectures in introductory game theory, from a course I delivered in semester 1 down under here in NZ Feb to June 2007 . I suggest you click on the "Reverse Sort Order " text/link in blue in the right hand menu bar (top right) to see clips in chronological) orderEach clip is about 50 minutes. Downloadable versions (see mov or mp4 link just under the on screen viewer) usually have a menu; these are mostly screen capture and coordinated audio, with some overlays of class interaction (voyeuristic, but sometimes a little slow compared to lecture style...) There is a comments box below each media clip - comment away The downloadable video files are typically quite large (80 to several hundred Mb) Quicktime (".mov") or .mp4 files with a larger screen size (640x480) - ok for broadband; Copyright resides in the author/presenter, usually me, but sometimes someone else... (non commercial use and share-alike derivative works are ok) This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-Share Alike 3.0 License. support for this open education project comes from the UC College of Business and Economics (Thanks Nigel!!) - but all errors of ommission and commission are mine! JF Please let me know if you have any difficulties using the material or suggestions for improvements. John Fountain strategic,economics en John Fountain John Fountain This lecture continues our discussion and analysis of strategic interaction with asymmetric information and uncertainty. We examine the problem of adverse selection and the "lemons" problem (why is the used car you buy likely to be a "lemon"?) . Here, bad quality products drive out good quality products. Next we look at attempts to solve the lemons type problem: can uninformed buyers find tests or screens to help resolve their uncertainty? Can privately informed sellers provide signals like warranties or certification reports that buyers will believe? Thu, 25 Oct 2007 06:12:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=32 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk1007lecture20.mp4 I like this lecture. We start reviewing and re-explaining the natural frequency & truth table ideas about basic technological and diagnostic uncertainties in the venture capitalist game. Then we sketch the game tree here, concentrating on using information sets to help us set out what the players know and don't know in the game, and what they know and don't know about what other players know and don't know..etc....Then we try to figure out : what's it reasonable to believe in a game like this? Here we use our previous ideas about player's strategies to help use our beliefs about diagnostics and technologies to help figure out what should I believe here? Naturally the answer is complicated...but the intuition is worthwhile, coz we run smack into the problem of multiple reasonable things to believe...and "bad" equilibria...all because of private information. Two examples: why men in NZ are reluctant to enter into primary care education, why career oriented women may have a tough time finding good jobs. Thu, 25 Oct 2007 04:41:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=31 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk1007lecture19.mp4 We finish off our brief introduction to the element of surprise via mixed strategies by showing how mixed strategy Nash Equilibria can be found in in other 2x2 games. Then we start a new topic : games of imperfect and asymmetric information. Here, uncertainty remains a key feature, but different agent's have different uncertainties, or put another way, different agent's have different bits of private information that might be relevant to the game. We set up a venture capitalist example from Kreps' Microeconomics for Managers in the latter half of this lecture (for this and the next lecture) Thu, 25 Oct 2007 04:25:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=30 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0907lecture18.mp4 This lecture has two parts. The first part tests your understanding of inverse probability reasoning (we look again at the question of how much to believe a witnesses report in an accident case). The second part introduces the idea of a mixed strategy in a simple 2x2 simultaneous game that has no Nash Equilibria in pure strategies. Thu, 25 Oct 2007 04:22:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=29 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0907lecture17.mp4 This is one of two lectures thinking deeply and critically about uncertainty in situations of strategic interaction. The first part of the lecture develops the operational subjective concept of probability, using the prices/odds set by the sports betting bookies at NZ's TAB to show how subjective probability, while personal, can be measured, by asking agents to "put their money where their mouth " is. The second part uses Gigerenzer's "natural frequency" method of communicating and thinking about uncertainty to explain inverse probability and Bayes theorem (no formulas please - only a "truth table" and, if you're a visual person, a graph, to develop "ballpark" boundedly rational assessments for inverse proabilities. Thu, 25 Oct 2007 04:20:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=27 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0807lecture15.mp4 We introduce the idea of a sub game perfect Nash Equilibrium analyzing the entry deterrence game as a simultaneous game to show how there might be several Nash Equilibria but only one sub game perfect one...(ie one that sustains repeated questioning about rational behaviour in every possible sub game of the original game - eben sub games where you don't eve expect to be) . Looked at this way there turn out to be several Nash Equilibria...not all of which are "reasonable". The latter part of the class introduces a simple card game as we begin a new section on games of imperfect information. Thu, 25 Oct 2007 04:15:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=24 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0607lecture12.mp4 In this lecture we start making connections: How do simultaneous game concepts relate to sequential game concepts? In particular how does the rollback equilibrium idea connect with Nash Equilibrium concept? We analyze sequential games as simultaneous games, and vice versa, dig a bit deeper into the concept of Nash Equilibrium, then introduce information sets as a way of analyzing simultaneous games as sequential games Thu, 25 Oct 2007 04:14:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=23 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0607lecture11.mp4 Seq games cont'd (4th of 4 lectures): bargaining over a shrinking pie -the alternating offer bargaining game (classroom experiments & game tree analysis), the ultimatum game; using simple game tree's to analyze the strategic issues of lock-in and hold-up (check out to Varian and Shapiro Information Rules) Fri, 12 Oct 2007 05:35:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=11 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0307lecture6.mp4 In this lecture I discuss how to interpret, and how not to interpret, payoff numbers. The discussion uses the simple 2x2 game tree we constructed to analyze sequential games, but it applies equally well to payoffs in simultaneous games. Then we begin to change the games we look at, starting with changing the order of moves in a 2x2 game. A simpler type of game tree can be used to analyze games with your future self - especially whether or not to take mind and mood altering substances, from nicotine through to LSD and cocaine. Note, the Audio got corrupted (due to radio wave interference in a neighboring lecture theatre). It's 90% OK after editing but annoying in places Fri, 12 Oct 2007 05:32:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=10 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0307lecture5.mp4 Continuing on with our simple 2x2 sequential game we now examine in more detail a key concept - strategy- and how to count and identify the possible strategies in our our simple game, then for more complex games..including the stop-go game from the first lecture.! Thu, 11 Oct 2007 20:17:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=9 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0207lecture4.mp4 This is the first of four lectures on sequential games. AFter reviewing some definitions we start by talking a little bit about "theory", summed up in an acronym PDIP (who are the players, what can they do, what information/ignorance do they have, what are their payoffs). Our first games will be games of complete information (every player knows everything every other player does, each knows that the others know that, each knows that the the others know that they know.....PLUS no uncertainty inherent in the game) Then we look at how to analyze a simple 2x2 game using a neat graphical concept : the game tree. Thu, 11 Oct 2007 20:14:00 GMT http://strategicecon.com/modules/journal/entry.php?space_key=1&module_key=4&post_key=8 http://strategicecon.com/viewfile.php/users/49/4/GameTheory2007/wk0207lecture3.mp4