Edited version of lecture 2, 2009. In this lecture we analyzed and discussed behaviour and reasoning in the simple stop go game that we played out yesterday in class. The pace of the lecture is slow, we don't get into a lot of theoretical jargon (yet), but mostly concentrate on student reasoning processes.
We also introduced the key list of 6 questions that identify various pure types of  situations  of strategic interaction (games)- each of which involves its own distinctive strategic issues:

• 1. Is the game simultaneous or sequential game?
• 2. Are  interests  always in conflict or are there opportunities for cooperation?
• 3. Is the game played once (single shot) or repeatedly?
• 4a. What kinds of, uncertainty, if any, exist in the game? 4b.  Is information about the structure of the game, or ignorance, lack of such information, “unequal” (asymmetric)?
• 5. Are the rules of the game fixed or manipulable?
• 6. Are agreements to cooperate enforceable or not? cooperative vs non cooperative games

...as ever, more resources are located at the Econ 223 class website

Introductory lecture in 2009. The details of the lecture including today's handout (with your first homework set )   can be found at the course webpage here. There is a portion of the webcast where I am walking around the classroom (there are around 140 students enrolled) discussing who is going to do what as part of the game. Towards the end of the lecture we discuss the reasoning that selected students used in this years class as well as in other years. You might find it worthwhile to look at the 5 minute discussion of the stop go game in 2008 too:  there was more "giving" last year than this year!! -
This lecture has a lot of classroom discussion time. It's a big class, and might get a bit tedious if you're watching offline. At the beginning of lecture 2 we do some review and analysis...which you should look at: ie lecture 1 (end) and lecture 2(beginning) are connected
...as ever, more resources are located at the Econ 223 class website